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Eilidh Robb 
LLM in Global Environmental Law & Govern-
ance, University of Strathclyde – LLM Disserta-
tion 
Abstract  
Until the 20th of January 2017, democracy was as-
sumed to be secure within the United States but for 
the first time in recent history, America is now being 
presented as a ‘flawed democracy’1 with the actions 
of President Donald Trump raising several red flags. 
His predilection towards authoritarian leadership, 
lack of respect for his executive powers, and insist-
ence on “alternative facts”, challenge many facets of 
democracy – and, of particular relevance to this 
study, frustrate efforts to mitigate climate change 
through policy and government. With an administra-
tion so clearly intent on shutting down climate change 
action, civil society is turning to the only avenue it has 
left – the law – and is taking climate change issues to 
court in a last-ditch attempt to push for action. By in-
vestigating twelve concluded climate change cases 
initiated after Donald Trump entered office, the ways 
in which the courts can continue to defend democratic 
values can be explored. This research therefore 
seeks to draw new connections between the separa-
                                                        
1 The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Declining Trust in 
Government Is Denting Democracy’ (The Economist, 
2017) <https://www.economist.com/graphic-de-
tail/2017/01/25/declining-trust-in-government-is-dent-
ing-democracy> accessed 9 July 2018. 
2 S Levitsky & D Ziblatt, ‘Is Donald Trump a Threat to 
Democracy?’ (The New York Times, 2016) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/sun-
day/is-donald-trump-a-threat-to-democracy.html> ac-
cessed 9 June 2018. 
3 S Mettler, ‘Democracy on the Brink’ [2017] Foreign 
Affairs <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-
essay/2017-04-17/democracy-brink>. 
4 Levitsky & Ziblatt (n 2). 
tion of powers, transparency, and accountability in cli-
mate change litigation as ways of safeguarding de-
mocracy in a period of crisis. While Donald Trump 
presents a real and imminent threat, the courts may 
be well placed as the necessary instrument for pro-
tecting democracy when we need it most. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Democratic Crisis in the United 
States 
Democracy, which will be examined in more de-
tail in the next section, is a defining feature of 
American governance and yet ‘Donald Trump’s 
election raised a question that few Americans 
ever imagined asking… is our democracy in 
danger?’2  
Until the 20th of January 2017, democracy was 
assumed to be secure within the United States 
(US)3 and without imminent war, threat of eco-
nomic collapse, or significant civil unrest, it 
seemed destined to remain that way. ‘Yet stabil-
ity is no guarantee of democracy’s future sur-
vival’4 – and nothing has proved that more 
clearly than the election of Donald Trump. While 
America’s economy and security remains stable, 
the actions of their leader are far from predicta-
ble. Even in the early days of the election cam-
paign, some had already identified Trump as a 
‘unique and present danger’5 to democracy. 
Aside from there being no evidence that Trump 
has ever spoken publicly in support of democ-
racy,6 there have been consistent red flags 
which signal a move away from democracy un-
der Donald Trump’s America. For the first time, 
the United States has been knocked out of the 
5 Editorial Board, ‘Donald Trump Is a Unique Threat to 
American Democracy’ (The Washington Post, 2016) 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/donald-
trump-is-a-unique-threat-to-american-democ-
racy/2016/07/22/a6d823cc-4f4f-11e6-aa14-
e0c1087f7583_story.html?utm_term=.e62dd2df9ca4> 
accessed 9 May 2018. 
6 M Liasson, ‘Donald Trump: Strong Leader or Danger-
ous Authoritarian?’ (NPR Politics, 2016) 
<https://www.npr.org/2016/12/12/505205197/is-donald-
trump-a-threat-to-democracy> accessed 9 May 2018. 
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“full democracy” category – being downgraded 
to a “flawed democracy” by the Economic Intelli-
gence Unit7 – a significant change which might 
signal the extent to which Trump is disrupting 
voter faith in government.  
Donald Trump’s willingness to ignore facts or of-
fer up “alternative facts” could be pushing us into 
a post-truth world, diminishing confidence in in-
stitutions, leaders and scientists alike. After 
launching his campaign for the presidency, 
Trump made a series of unfounded and distinctly 
damning accusations including: accusing Ted 
Cruz’s father of involvement in John F Ken-
nedy’s assassination;8 alluding to Hilary Clinton 
being guilty of murder;9 reporting that Muslims in 
New Jersey celebrated after 9/11;10 accusing 
Mexico of sending rapists into America;11 ques-
tioning Barack Obama’s citizenship;12 ‘openly 
challeng[ing] the legitimacy of the electoral pro-
cess’;13 and perhaps most significantly, after 
winning the election, claiming that he lost the 
popular vote majority because ‘millions of noncit-
izens voted illegally.’14 Although it would be easy 
to dismiss these actions and accusations as 
nonsense, they have potentially very serious im-
plications. They indicate that Trump feels him-
self removed from the normal societal expecta-
tions of evidence, fact, and accuracy. So much 
so that it clearly ‘does not matter whether or not 
he contradicts himself,’15 or whether his all-out 
war on the mainstream media for publishing 
“fake news”16 presents itself as highly ironic. 
Trump’s promotion of “alternative facts” to dis-
credit accepted authority – ranging from subtle 
attempts to influence opinion, to obvious attacks 
on the foundation of the voting system in the US 
– contributes towards destabilising democracy. 
                                                        
7 I Oh, ‘A New Report Finds America Is No Longer a 
“Full Democracy”’ (Mother Jones, 2017) 
<https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/01/new-
report-finds-america-no-longer-full-democracy/> ac-
cessed 9 April 2018. 
8 Editorial Board (n 5). 
9 Editorial Board (n 5). 
10 Editorial Board (n 5). 
11 Editorial Board (n 5). 
12 Liasson (n 6). 
13 Levitsky & Ziblatt (n 2). 
14 Liasson (n 6). 
15 J Butler, ‘Reflections on Trump’ (Cultural Anthropol-
ogy, 2017) <https://culanth.org/fieldsights/1032-reflec-
tions-on-trump> accessed 9 May 2018. 
Further, Donald Trump has revealed that he 
knows almost nothing about the limits to his ex-
ecutive powers – laying bare his ignorance when 
it comes to his grasp of the separation of powers 
principle that drives American democracy. 
Trump turned some of his allegations into 
threats, promising to: ‘alter libel laws so journal-
ists could be "sued like they've never been sued 
before”’;17 throw Hilary Clinton in jail while por-
traying her as an illegitimate opponent;18 punish 
those who criticized him;19 and limit the freedom 
of the independent press.20 Not only do most of 
these threats lie far beyond the extent of his ex-
ecutive powers, but they lie outside the bounda-
ries of democracy. Furthermore, Trump seems 
to think he ‘lives above the law,’21 pushing Amer-
ican democracy closer towards authoritarian dic-
tatorship – and this is a slippery slope. Authori-
tarianism starts with ‘the president making deci-
sions about particular companies, rather than 
working within the system… in the context of the 
rule of law’22 – and while this may initially appear 
harmless, this can move quickly towards fascism 
as the president starts to ‘act as if he has the 
sole power to decide.’23  
However, challenges to democracy did not start 
under the presidency of Donald Trump. His pre-
decessors have combatted other democratic 
threats and useful tools have emerged that en-
sure resilience in their system of government.24 
Former White House aide to George W. Bush, 
Bill Galston, argued that checks and balances 
under the separation of powers principle are de-
liberately designed to combat these kinds of 
threats25 – and he is not alone, many Americans 
reported faith in their systems as the reason for 
their lack of concern.26 Yet, the warning signs re-
main and the ‘institutional safeguards protecting 
16 Mettler (n 3). 
17 Liasson (n 6). 
18 Levitsky & Ziblatt (n 2). 
19 Editorial Board (n 5). 
20 Editorial Board (n 5). 
21 Butler (n 15). 
22 Liasson (n 6). 
23 Butler (n 15). 
24 Mettler (n 3). 
25 Liasson (n 6). 
26 Levitsky & Ziblatt (n 2). 
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[US] democracy may be less effective than we 
think,’27 especially with the rise of the far-right 
across Western Europe.28 Under Donald Trump 
‘the next few years will be a kind of stress test 
for the liberal, democratic constitutional institu-
tions’29 that have been built – and nowhere is 
that stress better demonstrated than through 
Trump’s approach to tackling climate change, or 
more accurately his failure to tackle climate 
change.  
1.2. Climate Change in Context 
Scientific consensus on human induced climate 
change has reached 97%,30 and while research 
results have been varied (as they often are in 
science), the latest International Panel on Cli-
mate Change report announced that they were 
‘95% certain that humans are the main cause of 
current global warming’31 – a probability level 
which in the scientific field is tantamount to a cer-
tainty. 
With policy makers recognising the increased 
threat of climate change, debate has shifted 
from the plausibility of climate change to how 
best to mitigate and adapt to changing climates. 
Policy makers have been forced to not only up-
date national laws, but to engage in complex in-
ternational debate to create continent-spanning 
legislation that better reflects the urgency of the 
situation. As such, the Paris Agreement was 
signed in December 2015 and applied at one 
time to every country in the world, pushing for a 
commitment from parties to keep global temper-
ature increase to ‘well below 2°C above pre-in-
dustrial levels.’32 This universal commitment to 
reducing greenhouse gases was monumental as 
it placed pressure on governments to integrate 
                                                        
27 Levitsky & Ziblatt (n 2). 
28 P Foster, ‘The Rise of the Far-Right in Europe Is Not 
a False Alarm’ (The Telegraph, 2016) <https://www.tel-
egraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/19/the-rise-of-the-far-right-
in-europe-is-not-a-false-alarm/> accessed 9 November 
2018. 
29 Liasson (n 6). 
30 Skeptical Science, ‘The Consensus Project’ (The 
Consensus Project, 2018) <http://theconsensuspro-
ject.com/#sharePage>. 
31 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report’ (In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014) v. 
32 Paris Agreement, UN/1/CP.21 (entered into force 4th 
Nov 2016) Article 2, 3. 
climate change into political decision making 
whist highlighting the urgent need for policy to 
reflect this pressing issue. Unfortunately, despite 
the evidence and international support, climate 
change deniers across the world have not been 
silenced; and most problematically, they may 
have just found themselves a figurehead in 
President Donald Trump. 
The US retains prominence as one of the world’s 
most influential economies, making it a major 
political force when it comes to international de-
cision making and trend setting. Furthermore, 
‘US policy shifts have implications far beyond its 
borders’33 making the US an important catalyst 
in the movement towards mitigating climate 
change. Yet, the election of Trump has led to un-
deniable consequences for future progress in 
fighting climate change, shifting the rhetoric from 
scientific fact to “fake news” and “alternative 
facts” that bolster harmful economic agendas 
and close the door to efforts to mitigate climate 
change. Although the ‘scientific evidence does 
not change when an administration changes’34 
the combination of political priority, scientific 
credibility, and presidential aims certainly has 
the power to shift debate and crucially, redirect 
funding. Since the election of Donald Trump, 
there appears to be no limit to the extent of up-
heaval his administration is willing to endure in 
order to cast doubt on the science of climate 
change, and critically the need to mitigate 
against it.  
Under Trump, the administration’s priorities 
have been made abundantly clear: removing cli-
mate change from a list of global threats;35 elim-
inating the page dedicated to it on the White 
House website;36 and opening up a narrative 
33 T Rinberg et.al. ‘Changing the Digital Climate’ (Envi-
ronmental Data & Governance Initiative 2018) 6. 
34 J Samet, T Burke & B Goldstein, ‘The Trump Admin-
istration and the Environment — Heed the Science’ 
(2017) 376 New England Journal of Medicine 1182, 
1187. 
35 J Borger, ‘Trump Drops Climate Change from US 
National Security Strategy’ (The Guardian, 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/dec/18/trump-drop-climate-change-na-
tional-security-strategy> accessed 7 October 2018. 
36 A Wilts, ‘Trump Officially Removes Climate Change 
from List of Global Threats’ (Independent, 2017) 
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questioning scientific confidence in climate 
change by inspiring ‘scandals over climate 
change science.’37 Trump has led efforts to dis-
mantle the Barack Obama administration’s cli-
mate change policies; delete the Clean Power 
Plan and reverse moratoriums on coal and 
gas.38 With no attempt to hide his opinions on 
climate change, declaring during the elections 
that climate change was ‘a “hoax”, and as presi-
dent proving his actions to be consistent with 
that view,’39 Trump has created a detrimental at-
mosphere of doubt and uncertainty around cli-
mate change science. The administration has 
cut funding for the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA);40 entered an all-out war with Na-
tional Parks;41 reignited discussions around the 
survival of the coal industry; changed national 
monument laws to allow for fossil fuel extraction; 
withdrawn from the Paris Agreement; and has 
taken one huge step towards ‘Making Atmos-
pheric Carbon Levels Great Again’42 – and not in 
a good way. With an administration so clearly in-
tent on shutting down climate change action, 
civil society is turning to the courtroom for solu-
tions, pushing for action on climate change 
through the only avenue left.  
                                                        
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ameri-
cas/us-politics/trump-climate-change-threats-remove-
list-global-dangers-national-security-latest-
a8117486.html> accessed 18 August 2018. 
37 H Osofsky, ‘Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Fed-
eral Climate Change Regulation: Implications of AEP v. 
Connecticut’ (2012) 46 Valparaiso University Law Re-
view 13, 449. 
38 E Bomberg, ‘Environmental Politics in the Trump 
Era: An Early Assessment’ (2017) 26 Environmental 
Politics 956. 
39 Rinberg et.al. (n 33) 6. 
40 G Thrush & C Davenport, ‘Donald Trump Budget 
Slashes Funds for EPA and State Department’ (The 
New York Times, 2017) <https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/budget-epa-state-de-
partment-cuts.html> accessed 17 August 2018. 
41 F Robinson, ‘Trump Administration’s Feud with the 
National Park Service Is Absurd’ (The Guardian, 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2017/jan/25/national-park-service-trump-twitter-
campaign-spreads> accessed 17 August 2018. 
42 K Aronoff, ‘Does Donald Trump Represent a Step 
Forward for Climate Change Action?’ (The Guardian, 
1.3. Climate Change in the Courtroom 
Under the separation of powers principle – the 
division of power between the executive, the leg-
islature and the judiciary – the most effective 
pathways for achieving action on climate change 
are through the executive or the legislature. Yet, 
with a government headed up by an active cli-
mate change denier;43 the courts are increas-
ingly being used as a way to challenge legisla-
tive and executive decision making (or lack of 
decision making) on climate change. While the 
courts are widely considered a less effective 
mechanism for policy-making, ‘there is nothing 
new about regulation by litigation’44 and increas-
ingly, ‘states and non-profit groups are turning to 
the courts for solutions to the challenges pre-
sented by climate change.’45 In recent years the 
US has become a ‘staging ground for 654 cli-
mate-related cases’46 making it a global leader 
on climate change litigation. Yet tackling climate 
change in the courtroom is controversial, and not 
always successful.  
Taking science to court is challenging enough,47 
but the spatial, temporal, and political challenges 
that climate change brings, makes the issue 
even more complex to address.48 Legal require-
ments such as standing, ripeness, jurisdiction 
and the political question doctrine all create bar-
2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2016/may/16/donald-trump-energy-policy-climate-
change> accessed 20 June 2018. 
43 D Carrington, ‘Can Climate Litigation Save the 
World?’ (The Guardian, 2018) <https://www.theguard-
ian.com/environment/2018/mar/20/can-climate-litiga-
tion-save-the-world> accessed 7 August 2018. 
44 B Ewing & D Kysar, ‘Prods and Pleas: Limited Gov-
ernment in an Era of Unlimited Harm’ (2011) 121 The 
Yale Law Journal 350, 386. 
45 A Kaswan, ‘The Domestic Response to Global Cli-
mate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litiga-
tion Initiatives’ (2007) 42 University of San Francisco 
Law Review 39, 85. 
46 O Milman, ‘More People Heading to Court to Spur 
Action on Climate Change’ (The Guardian, 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/environ-
ment/2017/may/23/climate-change-government-court-
cases-study>. 
47 K Sali, ‘Scientific Evidence in Environmental Litiga-
tion’ (2016) 30 Natural Resources & Environment 27. 
48 H Osofsky, ‘The Continuing Importance of Climate 
Change Litigation’ (2010) 1 Climate Law 3. 
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riers to tackling climate change through litiga-
tion. Not only have the courts been heavily criti-
cised for lacking in expertise when it comes to 
making decisions on climate change,49 but their 
legitimacy to make decisions on political matters 
is also up for debate. ‘The appropriate role of the 
courts in what [is] perceived to be [a] highly po-
litical issue’50 is a continuous struggle for lawyers 
as they try to claim the space of the courts in cli-
mate change litigation. Climate change in the 
courts has to overcome the challenges of legiti-
macy, the separation of powers, and fundamen-
tal difficulties of scale. The breadth of a case 
matters, the narrower it is the more likely it is to 
be successful, but the less able it is to address 
the full extent of the climate change problem. 
However, litigation as a form of resistance is sig-
nificant for many reasons and often ‘cases need 
not even get that far to have an impact.’51 Litiga-
tion can act as a driver for research – as the 
number of climate change lawsuits increase, the 
need for scientific information on the effects and 
responses to climate change increases.52 Litiga-
tion can also help to influence public opinion on 
the urgency of climate change,53 instigating a 
shift in thinking that places increasing pressure 
on governments to act. Tackling climate change 
in the courtroom ultimately contributes to deci-
sion making by acting as a ‘vehicle for protest 
and political discourse.’54 Supported by past ev-
idence in the 1950s when the civil rights move-
ment proved the ability of the courts to act. 
‘Washington’s failure to tackle the problem of ra-
cial inequality in education led ultimately to 
Brown v Board of Education’55 which eventually 
prompted the creation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964: the same could happen for climate 
change. Acting as a means to apply pressure on 
government, whether the cases are successful 
                                                        
49 J Peel & H Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation: Reg-
ulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2015) 34. 
50 J Lin, ‘Climate Change and the Courts’ (2012) 32 Le-
gal Studies 35, 57. 
51 J Schwartz, ‘Courts as Battlefields in Climate Fights’ 
(The New York Times, 2010) <https://www.ny-
times.com/2010/01/27/business/energy-environ-
ment/27lawsuits.html> accessed 7 February 2018. 
52 S Tai, ‘Science Policy through the Lens of U.S Do-
mestic Climate Litigation’ (2010) 27 Science Policy in 
U.S Climate Litigation 462. 
53 Osofsky (n 48); Lin (n 50); Peel & Osofsky (n 49). 
54 Osofsky (n 48) 6. 
or not,56 litigation plays an invaluable role in de-
cision making:  
In the absence of strong government action to 
address climate change, rulings in climate 
change litigation may serve as a de facto 
source of national climate policy with very real 
impacts on the regulatory landscape.57 
Judges are influenced by society and as climate 
change continues to be a public concern, it is 
looking ‘increasingly likely [that judges will] look 
favourably on climate change litigation in coming 
years.’58 Thus, ironically, some have argued that 
Trump’s anti-climate change actions have legiti-
mised the role of the courts in climate change 
and made judges more ‘sympathetic to argu-
ments that might have seemed far-fetched a 
while ago… help[ing] to save the planet after 
all.’59 Fundamentally however, the courts are 
bound by the law, and their actions have to re-
flect that; any attempts to use litigation to force 
decision making on climate change thus have to 
focus on whether unlawful action has taken 
place, or will take place. Tackling climate change 
in court thus connects to wider values of democ-
racy which guide American governance and are 
enshrined across its legal system. It is this sym-
biotic relationship which this research seeks to 
explore; addressing the role that the courts can 
play in reinforcing democratic values through cli-
mate change litigation, crucially, when the gov-
ernment will not. 
Looking closely at concluded climate change lit-
igation in the first year of Donald Trump’s presi-
dency offers an opportunity to consider how 
democratic principles are addressed in the 
courtroom – pointing to the future role of the 
55 D Bookbinder, ‘How Trump’s Reckless Climate Pol-
icy Invites a Judicial Backlash’ (Vox, 2017) 
<https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2017/12/11/16759208/trump-climate-policy-courts-
juliana-public-nuisance-lawsuits> accessed 16 July 
2018. 
56 J Peel & H Osofsky, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Les-
sons and Pathways’ (2017) 29 Judicial Officers’ Bulle-
tin 99; Osofsky (n 48). 
57 J Peel, ‘Issues in Climate Change Litigation’ (2011) 1 
Climate Change Law Review 15, 23. 
58 Carrington (n 43). 
59 Bookbinder (n 55). 
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courts in both issues of climate change and po-
litical turbulence. The courts may have a unique 
opportunity to re-balance power, promote trans-
parency, and hold decision-makers accountable 
– this is undoubtedly important, and is where this 
research will strive to make a contribution. Inves-
tigating the role of the courts in challenging the 
current US administration’s efforts to depart from 
democracy, may identify a potential pathway for 
reinstating democratic values and priorities, 
while simultaneously revealing the challenges 
that litigation faces when tackling politics in the 
courtroom.  
1.4. Research Aim & Methodology 
After investigating recent climate change cases 
it became apparent that three themes were 
emerging as common features in the legal argu-
ments. These themes not only seemed to reflect 
legal issues but were also heavily connected to 
democracy, providing an opportunity to investi-
gate the relationship between the courts and de-
mocracy in Trump’s America. While much has 
been written about the use of litigation to mitigate 
climate change, little has been done to map the 
connections between the courts and democratic 
values as a positive catalyst for maintaining or-
der. This research therefore builds on the work 
that comes before it and strives to delve deeper 
into those climate change cases which have 
reached conclusion since Donald Trump’s inau-
guration on the 20th of January 2017, specifically 
highlighting how the wider democratic values of 
the separation of powers, transparency, and ac-
countability can be maintained through litigation. 
The overall research aim for this study therefore, 
is:  
To investigate how democracy can be 
maintained through the courts: looking 
specifically at the separation of powers, 
transparency, and accountability in the 
context of climate change litigation. 
To address this research aim, I will first offer 
some background on theories of democracy, the 
                                                        
60 T Hutchinson & N Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing 
What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17 
Deakin Law Review 83, 84. 
61 C Mccrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sci-
ences’ [2006] The Law Quarterly Review 632. 
separation of powers, transparency, and ac-
countability and while, within the limits of this 
study, this background cannot be extensive it 
provides context for the cases being investi-
gated. I will then seek to consider whether de-
mocracy can be maintained through the courts. 
Providing more detailed evidence using climate 
change litigation as a case study, looking at both 
opportunities and limitations for the courts. Ulti-
mately, the relationship between power, trans-
parency, and accountability as three key facets 
of democracy will be addressed, and conclu-
sions will be drawn about the ways in which de-
mocracy can, or cannot, be maintained through 
the courts.  
To conduct this investigation, I have taken a so-
cio-legal approach using doctrinal methodolo-
gies as the latter allows me to ‘make coherent or 
justify a segment of the law as part of a larger 
system.’60 However, this method cannot be re-
moved from wider social constructions61 and will 
therefore be used in tandem with a socio-legal 
outlook which will arguably allow me to ‘examine 
law’s social character far more extensively and 
broadly’62 than would be possible without exter-
nal perspective. Similarly, the nature of law 
makes it ‘highly susceptible to invasion by other 
disciplines’63 and thus my background in climate 
change science will compliment this research, 
while undoubtedly contributing to my interpreta-
tion. It should also be noted that I am a passion-
ate advocate for action on climate change and 
democracy, and thus this research will also by 
influenced by my attitude towards climate 
change deniers and those that threaten demo-
cratic principles. 
Selecting relevant climate change litigation to in-
vestigate as part of this study meant determining 
two key factors: first, how to define climate 
change litigation; and second, how to decide 
which specific cases to look at. To address these 
factors, I relied heavily on work by the Sabin 
Center for Climate Change Law at Colombia 
University, who created a database of climate 
change litigation filed in 2017 and most crucially, 
62 R Cotterrell, ‘Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted 
Sociologically?’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law & Society 
171, 191. 
63 Ibid. 178. 
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a report on ‘Litigation in the Age of Trump: Year 
One.’64 According to their studies, climate 
change litigation can be defined as any litigation 
that ‘directly and expressly raise[s] an issue of 
fact or law regarding the substance or policy of 
climate change causes and impacts.’65 Although 
this definition of climate change litigation may 
exclude cases which address climate change in-
directly, it was important for the purpose of this 
research to place a limit on the cases that I could 
investigate, due to the sheer number of applica-
ble cases. Similarly, I had to be selective when 
choosing specific cases to investigate within this 
definition. The report by the Sabin Center in-
cluded 82 cases filed in 2017, with the majority 
of cases (73%) as pro-environmental cases.66 
To narrow down my investigation, I chose to only 
address pro-environmental cases which had 
reached a decision in court. The decisions 
ranged from: court dismissal; self-dismissal; an 
order in favour of the environmental plaintiffs; or 
an order in favour of the non-environmental de-
fendants. In the end, this resulted in a total of 
thirteen cases, twelve of which are addressed 
fully in chapter three (the remaining one dealt 
with issues that arose pre-2017) and are up to 
date as of the 19th of July 2018. Their analysis 
will be used to help support discussion of de-
mocracy in the courtroom – specifically through 
reference to balancing power, transparency, and 
accountability.  
2. Components of Democracy  
2.1. Democracy 
There is arguably no straightforward definition of 
democracy – democracies vary across the world 
and underscore different cultural norms, values 
                                                        
64 D Adler, ‘U.S. Climate Change Litigation in the Age 
of Trump: Year One’ (Colombia Law School 2018). 
65 Peel & Osofsky (n 56) 100. 
66 Adler (n 64).  
67 D Gregory, The Dictionary of Human Geography (5th 
ed., Blackwell Publishers 2009) <https://search.cre-
doreference.com/content/entry/bkhumgeo/democ-
racy/0?institutionId=2454>. 
68 G Lautenbach, The Concept of the Rule of Law and 
the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford Scholar-
ship Online 2013) <https://www.oxfordscholar-
and beliefs. For some, democracy is plainly un-
derstood to mean ‘rule by the people,’67 whereas 
a legal perspective describes democracy as be-
ing about ‘the plurality of ideas, the freedom of 
speech, tolerance, broad mindedness, and polit-
ical representation through elections.’68 Across 
this spectrum of understanding, there are some 
generic characteristics that help to shape how a 
democracy might operate. Generally, democ-
racy is seen to include a free electoral system 
and resulting government; each enshrined by 
equitable values and practices.  
As a system of government, democracy works 
hard to promote fair and equal representation; 
honest and open relationships with its people; 
and a sense of security in a system that will en-
dure. Certainly, the values of the separation of 
powers, transparency, and accountability con-
tribute to creating a system of government that 
is responsible for its actions, considerate in its 
decision making, and open about its mistakes. 
However, ‘American democracy has always 
been a work in progress’69 and, while democracy 
may strive to uphold certain values, this does not 
always equate to democracy being the best sys-
tem of government. Winston Churchill famously 
noted this tension, stating that: ‘democracy is the 
worst possible system – except for all the rest,’70 
an understanding that succinctly captures the 
complexity of democracy and recognises its im-
perfections.  
Though flawed, democratic rule ensures the cre-
ation of strong informal norms; ‘democracies 
work best when unwritten rules of the game, 
known and respected by all players, ensure a 
minimum of civility and cooperation.’71 The ex-
pectations and values that surround democracy 
help to hold it in shape and ensure longevity 
even when its foundations start to crack. It is 
these intuitive democratic values which underpin 
ship.com/view/10.1093/ac-
prof:oso/9780199671199.001.0001/acprof-
9780199671199>. 
69 Mettler (n 3). 
70 R Dallek, ‘American Democracy Has Gone through 
Dark Times Before’ (The Guardian, 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2017/nov/01/american-democracy-dark-times-rob-
ert-dallek> accessed 9 May 2018. 
71 Levitsky & Ziblatt (n 2). 
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most of a nation’s population, that serve as the 
‘soft guardrails of democracy’72 protecting it from 
corruption, chaos, and ultimate catastrophe.  
2.2. Separation of Powers & The 
Political Question Doctrine 
2.2.1. Separation of Powers: A 
Definition 
The separation of powers is a defining feature of 
democracy73 and rests on the principle of bal-
anced power, the notion that the judiciary, exec-
utive and legislative branches of government 
should remain independent from one another to 
ensure a system of checks and balances that 
‘safeguard against the abuse of political 
power.’74 This tripartite system of government is 
particularly prominent under the American pres-
idential system, and generally remains uncon-
tested as a valuable asset to democracy. In 
practice, the balance of powers tends to vary; 
most distinctly between the executive and legis-
lative branches of government,75 and can differ 
not only across borders, but from president to 
president. Maintaining the balance of power is 
an ongoing process, achieved through balancing 
conflicting interests between the executive and 
the legislature, ‘in this way, the two discipline 
each other to the voters’ advantage.’76 The judi-
ciary then acts as the ‘umpire of the structure of 
separation of powers’77 managing the conflicts 
between the executive and the legislature, while 
simultaneously acting on the concerns of civil 
society and nudging government into action.  
                                                        
72 Levitsky & Ziblatt (n 2). 
73 T Persson, G Roland & G Tabellini, ‘Separation of 
Powers and Political Accountability’ (1997) 112 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1163. 
74 K Kirwan, ‘The Use and Abuse of Power: The Su-
preme Court and Separation of Powers’ (1995) 537 
ANNALS 76, 77. 
75 Persson, Roland & Tabellini (n 73). 
76 Persson, Roland & Tabellini (n 73) 1163. 
77 Kirwan (n 74) 76. 
78 T Moe & M Caldwell, ‘The Institutional Foundations 
of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presiden-
tial and Parliamentary Systems’ (1994) 150 Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 171. 
79 Kirwan (n 74) 77. 
80 Kirwan (n 74) 77. 
2.2.2. Separation of Powers: US 
Context 
In the American presidential system of govern-
ment, the major players tend to be the president 
and the legislators.78 Particularly under a Repub-
lican government, ‘the legislative authority nec-
essarily predominates,’79 except for the presi-
dent who holds the power to ‘recommend and 
veto legislation.’80 While in practice, the presi-
dent’s power is ‘strictly limited’81 and could be 
blocked, reversed or mitigated against – there 
remains a constitutional ambiguity when it 
comes to executive authority, which can ‘tempt 
presidents to try and push those limits’82 – mark-
ing their influence within the separation of pow-
ers system. Specifically, regarding the impact of 
the president, literature supports the notion that 
Trump would have significant power. In the con-
text of climate change: 
Though the administration cannot immediately 
change our bedrock environmental legislation, 
it can, through appointments, executive ac-
tions, and reduction or elimination of funding, 
affect research, policy, and implementation 
and enforcement.83 
Specifically, Trump has managed to exert a sig-
nificant breadth of influence across all three 
components of the separation of powers. His in-
fluence within the executive branch of govern-
ment, as head of state, is explicit and his access 
to the legislative branch through his role in con-
gress may also appear clear. Yet, his influence 
has proven to go beyond congress, extending to 
his appointment of certain key stakeholders at 
the federal level; as heads of independent agen-
cies such as Scott Pruitt’s84 placement at the 
81 Bomberg (n 38) 958. 
82 Levitsky & Ziblatt (n 2). 
83 Samet, Burke & Goldstein (n 34) 1186. 
84 J Lee & A Pearce, ‘How Trump Can Influence Cli-
mate Change’ (The New York Times, 2016) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2016/12/08/us/trump-climate-change.html> ac-
cessed 7 October 2018. The placement of Scott Pruitt 
at the head of the Environmental Protection Agency is 
significant because of his history; he is widely consid-
ered a close ally of the fossil fuel industry and has spo-
ken out publicly as a climate change denier. This 
choice of appointment is therefore not insignificant. 
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head of the Environmental Protection Agency. 
And within the judiciary, he appointed two new 
Supreme Court Judges at the beginning of his 
presidency, providing him opportunity to assert 
his influence through two out of nine of the Su-
preme Court Judges. Thus, Trump’s appoint-
ment of Supreme Court judges Neil Gorsuch and 
Brett Kavanaugh85 is not insignificant, as it evi-
dences his expanding control over the tripartite 
system of government. Across history, American 
leaders have ‘resisted the temptation to use their 
temporary control of institutions to maximum 
partisan advantage,’86 but that is not to say it will 
remain that way. Trump’s influence, having ex-
tended to all corners of the separation of powers 
system, directly challenges the balance of power 
on which democracy has been built – an influ-
ence which is played out particularly acutely in 
the context of climate change.  
2.2.3. Separation of Powers: 
Litigation Opportunities and 
Limitations 
The separation of powers principle is not without 
flaws and is frequently criticised for its impracti-
cability87 and inefficiency.88 Yet, what is most 
significant about the separation of powers in the 
context of litigation is the complicated dichotomy 
between (1) its ability to balance power, and (2) 
the limitations the separation of powers places 
on the courts. Thus, the separation of powers 
plays an inherently conflicted role in litigation: on 
the one hand acting to further democracy, while 
on the other, actively restricting the courts’ ability 
to do so.  
The judiciary might appear the least powerful of 
the three branches of government; ‘it cannot ex-
ecute its own decisions… [or] take over the gov-
ernment in the way that congress can’89 and ar-
guably only has the power to cast judgement or 
enforce already existing law. However, the 
courts can also be seen as the most appropriate 
                                                        
85 L Hurley & S Holland, ‘Trump Picks Conservative 
Judge Kavanaugh for Supreme Court’ (Reuters, 2018) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-
trump/trump-set-to-announce-hotly-anticipated-u-s-su-
preme-court-pick-idUSKBN1JZ25A> accessed 13 Sep-
tember 2018. 
86 Levitsky & Ziblatt (n 2). 
87 Ewing & Kysar (n 44). 
88 Moe & Caldwell (n 78). 
space for interpreting the constitution as their 
limited power makes them ‘the safest repository 
[to] enforce the supreme law of the land.’90 The 
courts’ role in applying the separation of powers, 
and ensuring that power in general is not 
abused, demonstrates the courts’ value as an 
avenue for protecting democracy.  
Yet, as mentioned, the courts’ role in rebalanc-
ing power through litigation is inherently com-
plex, most significantly as a result of the political 
question doctrine which stems from the separa-
tion of powers. The political question doctrine 
provides that the separation of powers would be 
breached if certain political issues were to be ad-
dressed in court.91 It therefore ensures that po-
litical matters are reserved for the executive and 
legislature – as they are considered the most 
able to decide on these issues. As such, in cases 
where the political question doctrine applies, the 
courts tend to dismiss the case on the grounds 
that it is ‘nonjusticiable’92 – presenting a signifi-
cant hurdle for those seeking to utilise the courts 
as guardians of democracy, specifically on the 
topic of climate change. This obstacle can result 
in both plaintiffs and defendants arguing over 
whether policy determination on climate change 
has been made,93 proving the limit of the courts’ 
ability to enforce certain actions under law. 
Despite this limited power, scope for litigation as 
a ‘direct pathway for climate change regulation’94 
is increasing, offering an important vehicle for 
holding governments accountable when civil so-
ciety becomes restless. Although the political 
question doctrine and the separation of powers 
can both be barriers for litigating on political mat-
ters, once plaintiffs overcome these hurdles, 
these principles can also provide an accessible 
route for checking power imbalances and rein-
stating democratic values. Focusing on climate 
change litigation as an arena for addressing 
power imbalance is particularly helpful as it:  
89 Kirwan (n 74) 77. 
90 Kirwan (n 74) 77. 
91 J Michaels, ‘An Enduring, Evolving Separation of 
Powers’ 115 Colombia Law Review 84. 
92 Osofsky (n 37) 451. 
93 Ewing & Kysar (n 44). 
94 Peel & Osofsky (n 49) 38. 
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Provides a window into the power dynamics 
that influence the current regulatory process. 
Examining the whirling dervish of interested 
entities highlights the complexity of addressing 
these externalities… but it also provides a path 
for making progress.95  
A better understanding of the complex dynamic 
between the separation of powers and litigation 
will help to unveil the contribution that litigation 
can make towards furthering democracy.  
2.3. Transparency 
2.3.1. Transparency: A Definition 
Transparency also has a complicated relation-
ship with democracy, and the extent to which 
transparency is valued tends to depend on the 
political context. Scholarly interpretations of 
transparency vary across disciplines, with inter-
pretations emerging from non-profit activist 
roots, to finance, international relations, and 
global governance. In general, however, inter-
pretations of transparency tend to include refer-
ence to openness,96 greater flows of infor-
mation,97 accountability,98 and an understanding 
that promoting transparency implies the exist-
ence of secrecy and corruption99 – creating a 
somewhat eclectic but workable definition of 
transparency which essentially encourages hon-
est communication between stakeholders. Even 
so, the meaning of transparency is constantly 
evolving and some argue that ‘offering a general 
definition of transparency as a starting point for 
                                                        
95 H Osofsky, ‘The Geography of Climate Change Liti-
gation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory Gov-
ernance’ (2005) 83 Washington University Law Quar-
terly 1789, 1855. 
96 C Ball, ‘What Is Transparency?’ (2009) 11 Public In-
tegrity 293. 
97 A Gupta, ‘Transparency in Global Environmental 
Governance: A Coming of Age’ (2010) 10 Global Envi-
ronmental Politics 1. 
98 M Mason, ‘Transparency for Whom? Information Dis-
closure and Power in Global Environmental Govern-
ance’ 7; Ball (n 96); Gupta (n 97). 
99 Ball (n 96). 
100 P Langley, ‘Transparency in the Making of Global 
Environmental Governance’ (2001) 15 Global Society 
73, 75. 
101 C Coglianese, ‘The Transparency President? The 
Obama Administration and Open Government’ (2009) 
273 Faculty Scholarship 1, 16. 
inquiry is highly problematic’100 – as its vague 
nature is often part of its value. Most signifi-
cantly, it is recognised that transparency is fun-
damentally ‘hard to measure’101 with no tangible 
unit of transparency, and many factors which in-
tertwine to support transparent activity. This can 
make transparency difficult to pin down in litiga-
tion, with its varied definition contributing to its 
potentially varied application in the courts.  
Transparency in government is generally con-
sidered to be heavily connected to other princi-
ples such as the ‘right-to-know’102 and infor-
mation disclosure103: two normative principles 
which work together to help instil democratic 
government.104 These principles combine to en-
sure public access to information and the ability 
to contribute to politics through, for example, 
comment and notice periods. Although these 
complimentary principles facilitate transparency, 
academic and practiced understanding of disclo-
sure is incomplete, and the ability to predict its 
accomplishments and threats remains largely 
unclear.105 Thus, the role and value of transpar-
ency within democracy is still not fully under-
stood which makes it a difficult democratic value 
to work with. In government, transparency is re-
garded as an effective political strategy as it 
‘sells well [and] everyone seems to favour it.’106 
It ‘improves administrative effectiveness,’107 
helps respond to tensions in modern society,108 
improves engagement across industries and 
stakeholder groups,109 improves public percep-
tions of politics,110 and helps to prevent abuses 
or mistakes by leaders.111 Transparency can 
102 T Beierle, ‘The Benefits and Costs of Disclosing In-
formation about Risks: What Do We Know about Right-
to-Know?’ (2004) 24 Risk Analysis 335, 336. 
103 Gupta (n 97). 
104 P Jaeger & J Bertot, ‘Transparency and Technologi-
cal Change: Ensuring Equal and Sustained Public Ac-
cess to Government Information’ (2010) 27 Govern-
ment Information Quarterly 371. 
105 Beierle (n 102). 
106 Coglianese (n 101) 18. 
107 Ball (n 96) 301. 
108 A Gouldson, ‘Risk, Regulation and the Right to 
Know: Exploring the Impacts of Access to Information 
on the Governance of Environmental Risk’ (2004) 12 
Sustainable Development 136. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Coglianese (n 101). 
111 Coglianese (n 101). 
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therefore be seen as a constructive aspect of de-
mocracy with the potential to reinstate confi-
dence in our political leaders. 
Despite this, transparency is considered a dou-
ble-edged sword;112 as it does not always evoke 
the desired result and requires careful applica-
tion to be effective. Significantly, how govern-
ment should go about designing transparent pol-
icies ‘is less than clear’113 and while most schol-
ars agree that transparency is necessary, there 
are significant criticisms and objections to hav-
ing too much transparency. Total transparency, 
for example, is argued to produce negative re-
sults by limiting the government’s ability to gain 
important information from private actors, gener-
ating internal dissent, and removing the oppor-
tunity to speak freely in order to tackle controver-
sial subjects. Thus, ‘reasoned transparency’114 is 
argued to be more effective than total transpar-
ency as it encourages visibility of explanations 
for decision making, rather than full disclosure. 
The real choice for government then, is ‘how 
much transparency, and what type to offer over 
different processes’115 – this involves compli-
cated trade-offs and compromises which do not 
often play out as intended while intertwining with 
notions of power and accountability in compli-
cated ways. 
2.3.2. Transparency: US Context 
The last decade highlights a complicated rela-
tionship between the US government and trans-
parency. During George W. Bush’s administra-
tion, government ‘worked to keep as much infor-
mation as possible… away from public view.’116 
                                                        
112 Coglianese (n 101). 
113 Ball (n 96) 2. 
114 Coglianese (n 101) 15. 
115 Coglianese (n 101) 2. 
116 Jaeger & Bertot (n 104) 372. 
117 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provides the 
public with a right to request access to records from 
federal agencies, and similarly requires agencies to 
disclose information under any request (unless it falls 
under one of the nine exemptions).  
118 Jaeger & Bertot (n 104). 
119 Coglianese (n 101) 5. 
120 Coglianese (n 101). 
121 Jaeger & Bertot (n 104). 
122 Jaeger & Bertot (n 104). 
123 Editorial Board (n 5). 
With limited access to information, denied Free-
dom of Information Act117 requests, and refusals 
to testify before congressional committees118 
George W. Bush went down in history as the 
‘The Secrecy President.’119 Following this, it is 
unsurprising that Barack Obama launched a 
campaign focused on expanding public access 
to information, criticising special interests, and 
promoting participation in decision making.120 
His presidency emphasised the need for trans-
parency in government, marked by two execu-
tive orders pushing for government agencies to 
prioritise openness when dealing with Freedom 
of Information Act requests121 and before the 
end of his first year Obama had issued a report 
on open government and generated an exten-
sive list of future projects for transparency.122  
Present day America promulgates a very differ-
ent relationship with transparency, both across 
congress and the executive. Donald Trump ran 
an election campaign which generated much 
controversy around the issue of transparency: 
he constructed a damaging narrative against Hil-
ary Clinton on the basis of withheld information 
about email security;123 he is suspected of en-
gaging in dubious Russian relationships;124 and 
he refused to reveal his tax returns.125 Continued 
evidence of the Trump administration’s rocky re-
lationship with transparency therefore comes as 
no surprise. Yet, Trump supporters might tell a 
different story: one of a president who is not 
afraid to speak the truth and is therefore more 
transparent than those that came before.126 
Whichever way you look at it, Trump clearly pro-
vokes interesting debate around the value of 
transparency in American democracy.  
124 B York, ‘Time to End the Crazy Secrecy of the 
Trump-Russia Investigation’ (Washington Examiner, 
2018) <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opin-
ion/columnists/byron-york-time-to-end-the-crazy-se-
crecy-of-the-trump-russia-investigation> accessed 21 
August 2018. 
125 Z Thomas, ‘What’s in Donald Trump’s Tax Re-
turns?’ (BBC News, 2016) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-us-2016-
36382410> accessed 9 December 2018. 
126 M Kinsley, ‘Trump the Transparent’ (The New York 
Times, 2017) <https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/06/17/opinion/sunday/trump-the-trans-
parent.html> accessed 9 December 2018. 
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Trump’s actions on transparency in respect of 
climate change, seem less open to interpreta-
tion. Following a trend of manipulating infor-
mation – evidenced most significantly by the re-
moval of climate change information across the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s platforms 
and beyond – the reduction in transparency is 
clear. Risk management plans, climate change 
concerns, and climate change priorities have 
been removed from official websites,127 manipu-
lating information to mislead and try to influence 
public opinion and ‘contribute to broader denial-
ist efforts that obscure and cast doubt on scien-
tific consensus on climate change.’128 These ac-
tions make it harder for the public to access high-
quality research and for policymakers to under-
stand climate change action, they diminish dem-
ocratic practices such as notice-and-comment 
periods, and ultimately contribute to a ‘wider 
practice of censoring science that is seen to be 
at odds with short-term economic gains.’129 
Opinions about Donald Trump on this matter re-
main divided however it can clearly be seen that 
the administration’s approach to tackling climate 
change has been one of increased secrecy; 
damaging for climate change science, litigation, 
and fact.  
2.3.3. Transparency: Litigation 
Opportunities and Challenges 
Exploring themes of transparency in a courtroom 
setting offers a unique opportunity to tackle po-
litical issues without actually being explicitly po-
litical. The ‘moral and political imperative… 
closely associated with the idea of accountability 
and inclusive governance’130 allows litigation on 
transparency to uniquely address political issues 
without asking the courts to directly decide on 
the outcome of a political argument.  
                                                        
127 Beierle (n 102). 
128 Rinberg et.al. (n 33) 4. 
129 Rinberg et.al. (n 33) 11.  
130 Mason (n 98) 9. 
131 A Florini, ‘Making Transparency Work’ (2008) 8 
Global Environmental Politics 14. 
132 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is the 
United States federal statute that dictates how adminis-
trative agencies of the federal government may pro-
pose and establish regulations. Significantly, it grants 
judiciary oversight over all agency actions – making it 
one of the most important parts of US administrative 
law. 
The courts actively embody the values of trans-
parency – and in fact, the credibility and func-
tionality of the courts rely on it.131 Proper inter-
pretation of the law, and objective rule making, 
demands transparency to achieve justice. Utilis-
ing transparency to achieve action on climate 
change or matters political, is regarded favoura-
bly by the courts who value a system of infor-
mation disclosure and transparency, as a key 
feature of justice.  
The most common way to address transparency 
in court is to utilise the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (APA),132 which applies to administra-
tive bodies, limiting the power of plaintiffs to tar-
get wider audiences on transparency, and in turn 
climate change. By avoiding the political ques-
tion doctrine in this way, transparency can only 
contribute by insisting that actors follow rules ap-
propriately – it cannot, for example, go as far as 
to create a rule, or enforce one that is not already 
there. This means that the scope of litigation is 
restricted to administrative errors and breaches 
of existing rules – making the ability of litigators 
to stop actions, or enforce new ones limited.  
2.4. Accountability 
2.4.1. Accountability: A Definition 
Accountability is considered a modern day 
‘buzzword,’133 which between the years 2001 
and 2006 appeared in around 70 proposed bills 
in US congress in each two-year cycle.134 This 
rise in the use of the term went hand in hand with 
an increased need to address citizen satisfaction 
rates; a key tool for political persuasion.135 Alt-
hough there has been increasing discussion 
about accountability in recent years – definitions 
of accountability remain ‘highly fragmented and 
133 M Bovens, R Goodin & T Schillemans (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (First Edi-
tion, Oxford University Press 2014) 1. 
134 Ibid. 
135 G Bouckaert & S Van de Walle, ‘Comparing 
Measures of Citizen Trust and User Satisfaction as In-
dicators of “Good Governance”: Difficulties in Linking 
Trust and Satisfaction Indicators’ (2003) 69 Interna-
tional Review of Administrative Sciences 329. 
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non-cumulative… virtually every different author 
sets out to produce his or her own definition.’136 
Accountability then, tends to be interpreted dif-
ferently across disciplines, but can generally be 
accepted to mean: ‘the expectation that one may 
be asked, often by an authority or one’s superior, 
to justify one’s thoughts, beliefs, or actions.’137 It 
is this definition that aligns closely with litigation 
– as the law strives to hold people directly ac-
countable for their actions. In general, the vari-
ous definitions of accountability tend to be con-
nected to responsibility, transparency, equity 
and power138 and contribute to attempts to en-
sure good-practice, and well-intentioned behav-
iour in politics – constructing a notion of account-
ability as a positive value within democracy.  
Accountability’s connection to power is central. 
Notably, the separation of powers principle is es-
sentially based on the notion that accountability 
through a tripartite system of government will en-
sure effective government.139 Each pillar of gov-
ernment is meant to ensure that the others are 
being held accountable. The idea is to employ 
‘counter-weights to promote good governance, 
political accountability, and compliance with the 
rule of law.’140 Similarly, when considering the 
role that accountability plays in balancing power, 
it is important to consider who is being held ac-
countable, and by whom; a concept which 
seems to have been challenged recently under 
the presidency of Donald Trump. Given the role 
of accountability in connecting ideas of balanced 
power and transparency under democracy, it is 
often hard to distinguish it as a separate value. 
Accountability’s broad definition tends to explain 
why it applies widely across litigation – acting 
alongside other democratic values. However, 
                                                        
136 Bovens, Goodin & Schillemans (n 133) 2. 
137 Bovens, Goodin & Schillemans (n 133) 4. 
138 T Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance and 
Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Chal-
lenges’ (2000) 21 Third World Quarterly 795. 
139 Ewing & Kysar (n 44). 
140 Michaels (n 91) 520. 
141 J Lee & K Quealy, ‘The 487 People, Places and 
Things Donald Trump Has Insulted on Twitter: A Com-
plete List’ (The New York Times, 2018) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/28/up-
shot/donald-trump-twitter-insults.html> accessed 9 De-
cember 2018. 
142 R Harrington, ‘Trump Goes Off-Script in Wild Rally 
in Michigan’ (Business Insider UK, 2018) 
that does not make it any less impactful or valu-
able to democracy.  
2.4.2. Accountability: US Context 
Since Trump entered office, he has taken a very 
different approach to leadership compared to 
those who came before him. He shares his unfil-
tered opinions on Twitter;141 goes off-script dur-
ing public appearances;142 fires staff members 
who have held long-standing positions of re-
sponsibility;143 and, on countless occasions, has 
accused the press of publishing “fake news” and 
“alternative facts.”144 His behaviour has been lik-
ened to that of a spoilt toddler;145 and yet it does 
not appear that the tripartite system of govern-
ment – certainly in respect of the executive or 
legislature – offers an effective means of holding 
him to account. Despite Trump being officially 
accountable to congress, that does not seem to 
impact on his actions as president – leaving the 
judiciary as the last line of defence of democracy 
through accountability. 
2.4.3. Accountability: Litigation 
Opportunities and Challenges 
At first glance, the relationship between account-
ability and litigation appears to be simple. The 
very nature of litigation is to hold citizens ac-
countable when they disobey the law. It would 
therefore not be unreasonable to assume that 
accountability and litigation go hand in hand to 
help protect democracy. However, two main fac-
tors threaten the ability of accountability within 
litigation to safeguard democracy: (1) time, and 
(2) specificity.  
<http://uk.businessinsider.com/trump-rally-white-
house-correspondents-dinner-2018-4/?r=US&IR=T> 
accessed 9 December 2018. 
143 C Graham, ‘“You’re Fired!”: Who Donald Trump Has 
Sacked and Who Has Resigned During His Time as 
President’ (The Telegraph, 2018) <https://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/0/fired-donald-trump-has-sacked-
has-resigned-time-president/>. 
144 Mettler (n 3). 
145 Radio Scotland, ‘Donald Trump “like a Spoilt Child” 
Says You’ve Been Trumped Film-Maker’ (BBC News, 
2012) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-
17995908> accessed 9 August 2018. 
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Litigation is an inherently slow process146 and, 
as already mentioned, not necessarily the best 
vehicle for decision making.147 So, although ac-
countability fits neatly into the context of the 
courtroom, it is limited by the courts’ inability to 
reach decisions quickly, interrogate evidence, or 
investigate claims at speed. This challenge be-
comes particularly evident when a case attempts 
to hold institutions accountable for slowing down 
action on climate change; often by the time the 
challenge has made it through the court, the pro-
posed stay or delay has reached its conclusion 
anyway – making it hard to prove that the case 
is still ripe. Given how urgent action on climate 
change needs to be, this is a significant limitation 
to tackling climate change through the courts on 
the grounds of accountability. Similarly, too, this 
poses challenges for democracy – as issues can 
be time sensitive, require fast action, or demand 
prompt decisions – a role which the courts can-
not fulfil.  
Secondly, the courts face another limitation in 
respect of accountability, in that they demand a 
heavy amount of specificity when progressing 
cases through the courtroom. For a case to be 
successful it has to prove that it is justiciable, the 
plaintiff has standing, and that the case is ripe. 
These factors alone dictate that the case needs 
to be narrow in nature. Although this may not al-
ways place limits on accountability, it can restrict 
the courts from making judgements that reflect 
the full extent of the accountability challenge, 
therefore limiting their ability to contribute fully 
towards a democratic outcome.  
2.5. The Interplay Between the 
Separation of Powers, Transparency 
& Accountability  
We have seen how each of these democratic 
values has its own specific significance in the 
context of litigation, the US, and Donald Trump, 
and I chose to present these values individually 
so as to make those connections clear. How-
ever, in reality, these values tend to overlap in 
litigation, and lie below the surface of climate 
                                                        
146 Peel (n 57). 
147 D Grossman, ‘Warming up to a Not-so-Radical Idea: 
Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation’ (2003) 28 Co-
lombia Journal of Environmental Law 1. 
change cases, often making them hard to iden-
tify. President Obama perfectly noted the rela-
tionship between these values, stating that ‘a de-
mocracy requires accountability, and accounta-
bility requires transparency’148 – noting the ways 
in which transparency and accountability go 
hand in hand149 in the context of democracy. The 
separation of powers which fundamentally 
guides democracy is similarly caught up in this 
relationship, contributing to, and at times chal-
lenging, the values of transparency and account-
ability in litigation.  
Each of these three values are important ele-
ments of democracy within their own right, but 
when presented together, they arguably contrib-
ute to strengthening the courts’ ability to protect 
democratic values. In combination, these values 
are able to contribute most effectively towards 
sustained democracy, and significantly provide 
both an avenue for the courts to influence gov-
ernment as well as protection from government 
threats to democracy. 
As the next section will demonstrate, the courts’ 
examination of the separation of powers, trans-
parency, and accountability contribute to democ-
racy both individually and collectively – to vary-
ing degrees of success. This investigation allows 
for the evaluation of the courts’ increased scope 
for protecting democratic values, specifically in 
the context of climate change litigation. 
3. Case Law & Discussion  
To substantiate the premise that democracy can 
be safeguarded in the courtroom by tackling the 
separation of powers, transparency, and ac-
countability, this chapter considers contempo-
rary evidence of these values being addressed 
in the courts in the context of climate change. 
Acknowledging that it is not the role of the courts 
to directly address issues of democracy – their 
role being to determine unlawful behaviour – 
plaintiffs therefore have to base their argument 
148 B Obama, ‘Office of the Press Secretary’ (2009) 39 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 429. 
149 Ball (n 96). 
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not on whether the defendants’ action was iniq-
uitous, but on whether or not it was legal. How-
ever, as already established, there are recurring 
themes that present themselves within litigation, 
with both legal and democratic significance. This 
chapter will first examine evidence from cases 
that demonstrate positive opportunities for litiga-
tion to further democratic values and will then 
address cases that appear to highlight the limi-
tations to litigation’s role in fostering democracy. 
3.1. Courtroom Opportunities: 
Upholding Democratic Values 
3.1.1. Sierra Club v Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
The case of Sierra Club v FERC150 demon-
strates how power can be addressed in court. 
Here, the petitioners requested an emergency 
stay on the construction of the NEXUS pipeline 
stretching from Ohio to Michigan, arguing that 
the defendants’ actions were an abuse of power. 
Petitioners laid out their argument following Cir-
cuit Rule 18(a)(1) which states that ‘an emer-
gency stay of an agency’s proceedings is war-
ranted where a movant establishes that it is (1) 
likely to prevail on merits, (2) likely to suffer ir-
reparable harm absent a stay, (3) other parties 
will be unlikely to suffer substantial harm if the 
stay is granted; and (4) the public interest lies in 
granting the stay.’151 Petitioners utilised a num-
ber of legal arguments to make their case, how-
ever it is their claim in respect of FERC’s misuse 
of power that underpins a significant thread of 
their overall argument. Petitioners argued that 
FERC did ‘not have the statutory authority to is-
sue tolling orders’;152 that the tolling order itself 
[was] insufficient as ‘congress did not authorise 
FERC to delegate its authority to act on such re-
quests’;153 and noting that ‘FERC’s lengthy toll-
ing periods encroach on the court’s rightful juris-
diction granted to it by congress, effectively ced-
ing the judicial branch’s sole power to define 
                                                        
150 Sierra Club v Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion [2017] 17-1236, D.C Cir. 
151 Ibid. 3.  
152 Sierra Club (n 150) 4. 
153 Sierra Club (n 150) 6. 
154 Sierra Club (n 150) 9. 
155 Colorado River Ecosystem et.al. v State of Colorado 
et.al. [2017] 1:17-cv-02316, D. Colo, Document 19. 
congress’ conferral of jurisdiction.’154 These ar-
guments conjoin to build a case against FERC 
as having acted unlawfully with respect to their 
delegated powers. Had unforeseen circum-
stances not resulted in the self-dismissal of this 
case by the petitioners, after discovering that 
one of their defendants had sold pipeline land to 
NEXUS making it a conflict of interest, it might 
be reasonable to assume that the petitioners’ 
case would have been successful. The courts 
would have had clear legal basis to support is-
suing an emergency stay – on the grounds that 
FERC’s actions breached their delegated pow-
ers – underlining the separation of powers prin-
ciple and providing an explicit example of the po-
tential role of the courts in re-balancing power 
and upholding democratic principles through the 
lens of climate change.  
3.1.2. Colorado River Ecosystem v 
State of Colorado 
The case of the Colorado River Ecosystem v 
State of Colorado155 is an interesting example of 
a case which did not enter the courts to try and 
rectify a wrong-doing. Instead, the strength of 
this case lay in its ability to set precedent and 
pave the way for future cases to follow. The 
plaintiffs’ complaint asked for the court to desig-
nate the Colorado River Ecosystem as ‘a person 
capable of possessing rights… to exist, flourish, 
regenerate, be restored, and naturally evolve’156 
noting that there had been ‘no related or similar 
cases before any courts’157 making it a matter of 
first impression. The plaintiffs drew upon previ-
ous examples to support the legal basis for their 
claim: citing the opinion of US Supreme Court 
Justice Douglas who argued in Sierra Club v 
Morton158 that ‘contemporary public concern for 
protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should 
lead to the conferral of standing upon environ-
mental objects’;159 the designation of Te Urew-
era, a 821-square mile area of New Zealand as 
a legal entity with ‘all the rights, powers, duties, 
and liabilities of a legal person'160 under the Te 
156 Ibid. 32.  
157 Colorado River Ecosystem (n 155) 32.  
158 Sierra Club v Morton et.al. [1972] 405 US 727.  
159 Colorado River Ecosystem (n 155) 18.  
160 Colorado River Ecosystem (n 155) 14. 
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Urewera Act of 2014; the 2016 decision under 
Colombia’s Constitutional Court to designate At-
rato River as ‘an entity subject to rights and pro-
tection, conservation, maintenance and restora-
tion’;161 and the 2017 High Court of Uttarak-
hand’s decision to rule that the Ganga and Ya-
muna Rivers are ‘legal persons/living persons’162 
in the north of India. The plaintiffs constructed a 
further argument that ‘the recognition of the Col-
orado River Ecosystem as a “person” is far less 
of a stretch than bestowing upon inanimate cor-
porations the status of personhood,’163 as has 
been done under US constitutional law – even 
without mention of corporations in the constitu-
tion. The case was eventually granted self-dis-
missal with prejudice by plaintiffs, who noted that 
‘the complaint represented a good faith attempt 
to introduce the Rights of Nature doctrine into 
our jurisprudence.’164 This case represents an 
attempt to shift judicial thinking, investigate the 
jurisdiction of the courts, and influence public 
opinion by utilising the courts as a pathway for 
better environmental protection. It challenges 
the role of the courts in balancing power, by pre-
senting it with a judicial challenge with clear po-
litical consequences. Significantly, this case by-
passes traditional non-judicial methods for pur-
suing a climate change agenda, instead using 
the courts as a site for action. Without a court 
decision, this case is unable to set legal prece-
dent, but instead paves the way for future cases 
by allowing the issues to be explored, highlight-
ing the potential role of the courts in promoting 
democracy by responding to public pressure.  
3.1.3. California v United States 
Bureau of Land Management – Two 
Cases 
The following two cases show how multiple dem-
ocratic values can be addressed, using both 
power and transparency, in an attempt to further 
democracy. The Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM)’s proposed Waste Prevention, Production 
                                                        
161 Colorado River Ecosystem (n 155) 21.  
162 Colorado River Ecosystem (n 155) 21.  
163 Colorado River Ecosystem (n 155) 19. 
164 Colorado River Ecosystem et.al. v State of Colorado 
et.al. [2017] 1:17-cv-02316, D. Colo, Document 24, 2. 
165 State of California et.al. v United States Bureau of 
Land Management et.al. [2017] 3:17-cv-03804, N.D 
Cal, 2. 
Subject to Royalties, and Resources Convention 
Rule (the Rule) sought to ‘reduce waste of natu-
ral gas from venting, flaring, and leaks during oil 
and natural gas production activities.’165 How-
ever, after the Rule came into effect in January 
2017, Donald Trump passed an Executive Order 
asking agencies to review actions, identifying 
those that:  
Potentially burden the development of use of 
domestically produced energy resources and 
appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind 
those that unduly burden the development of 
domestic energy resources beyond the degree 
necessary to protect the public interest or oth-
erwise comply with the law.166 
As a direct result of this executive order, on the 
15th of June 2017, BLM put notice in the Federal 
Register that they would be postponing the com-
pliance dates of their Waste Prevention Rule to 
the 17th of January 2018 – delaying the rule by a 
year. This formed the basis of the State of Cali-
fornia v Bureau of Land Management167 case on 
the 5th of July 2017, with plaintiffs ‘alleging that 
the decision by defendants to postpone certain 
compliance dates of the Rule violated the 
APA.’168 Particular attention was given to the in-
terpretation of Section 705 which outlines appro-
priate action regarding the postponement of a 
rule. Plaintiffs pointed to the decision in Safety-
Kleen Corp v Environmental Protection 
Agency169 which held that ‘Section 705 does not 
permit an agency to suspend a promulgated rule 
without notice and comment.’170 The plaintiffs 
further referenced sections 553(b) and (c) of the 
APA which outline notice-and-comment require-
ments, inferring that the defendants had violated 
these procedural requirements – actively aban-
doning transparency in their actions. In the end, 
the courts agreed, on the basis of these failures 
in transparency, and granted the plaintiffs mo-
tion for summary judgement and thus vacated 
the Postponement Notice.  
166 Executive Order No. 13,783 [March 28th, 2017] 82 
Fed Reg. 16,093. 
167 State of California (n 165).  
168 State of California (n 165) 4. 
169 Safety-Kleen Corp. v Environmental Protection 
Agency [1996] U.S. App. LEXIS, *2 D.C. Cir.  
170 State of California (n 165) 12. 
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However, the legal challenge did not finish there, 
and on the 8th of October 2017 BLM introduced 
a Suspension Rule, which provoked the emer-
gence of the State of California v Bureau of Land 
Management171 case on the 19th of December 
2017. Plaintiffs now moved to ‘challenge the 
Suspension Rule… moving for a preliminary in-
junction’172 – which could be obtained by demon-
strating four factors: ‘(1) that [they were] likely to 
succeed on the merits, (2) that [they are] likely to 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of prelim-
inary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in 
[their] favour, and (4) that an injunction is in the 
public interest.’173 The plaintiffs again mentioned 
the defendant’s failure to provide an appropriate 
notice and comment period, arguing that ‘the no-
tice and comment in this case was not meaning-
ful because Secretary Zinke had already deter-
mined the outcome of the rulemaking before re-
ceiving comment and had limited the scope of 
the rulemaking comments so as not to consider 
those addressing the substance of the Rule or 
Suspension Rule.’174 While the court disagreed 
on the plaintiffs’ suggestion that the defendants 
engaged in predetermination, they pointed out 
that the plaintiffs ‘argument regarding the Secre-
tary’s limitation of the scope of the comments.. 
[had] more merit.’175 The court found that Secre-
tary Zinke failed to consider certain comments, 
claiming them to lie outside the scope of the Pre-
vention Rule – which the court deemed as ‘arbi-
trary and capricious within the meaning of the 
APA.’176 Thus, the plaintiffs were successful in 
arguing that the defendants actions were unlaw-
ful on the basis of poor transparency – eventu-
ally leading to their success in being granted a 
preliminary injunction on the Suspension Rule, 
which reinstated the Rule.  
The result of both cases demonstrates how mul-
tiple legal issues that are also important demo-
cratic values can be successfully addressed 
within litigation. In these cases, the intercon-
nected nature of these democratic values is also 
                                                        
171 State of California et.al. v United States Bureau of 
Land Management et.al. [2017] 3:17-cv-07187, N.D 
Cal.  
172 Ibid. 4.  
173 State of California (n 171) 5. 
174 State of California (n 171) 22. 
175 State of California (n 171) 23. 
176 State of California (n 171) 24. 
apparent, and significant. Donald Trump’s Exec-
utive Order provoked both actions, and by ruling 
in favour of the plaintiffs, the courts were able to 
adhere to the separation of powers principle 
within democracy. These cases therefore, 
demonstrate how the courts can, by directly 
challenging breaches of transparency and 
abuses of power which contradict the law and 
the opinions of civil society, also indirectly con-
tribute towards maintaining democratic values.  
3.1.4. Natural Resources Defense 
Council v National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration 
The case of Natural Resources Defense Council 
v National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA)177 was set in the context of the 2015 
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act 
Improvement Act of 2015 (Improvements Act) 
and also highlights power and transparency is-
sues. The Improvements Act, passed by con-
gress, ‘requir[ed] federal agencies to adjust their 
civil penalties to account for inflation.’178 Plain-
tiffs claimed however that the defendants ‘ex-
ceeded [their] statutory authority in indefinitely 
delaying a rule implemented pursuant to the 
clear congressional directive in the Improve-
ments Act’ and simultaneously violated the 
APA179 alluding to failures to align with the sep-
aration of powers and transparency. Here, the 
court investigated the plain and core interpreta-
tions of the Improvements Act and found the in-
tentions of the act to be clear and mandatory,180 
concluding that the statute ‘does not authorise 
NHTSA to indefinitely delay implementation of 
these penalty increases’181 – noting that the ‘pur-
pose of the Act is simply incompatible with the 
notion of indefinite delay.’182 In this example the 
court therefore found it relatively easy to support 
the accusation that the NHTSA was acting out-
side its delegated power, finding also that the de-
fendants had breached the APA in their failure to 
177 Natural Resources Defense Council et.al. v National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration et.al. [2017] 17-
2780 (L), 2nd Cir.  
178 Ibid. 4.  
179 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 177) 5.  
180 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 177) 26.  
181 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 177) 27.  
182 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 177) 28.  
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adhere to the notice-and-comment provision.183 
The court ordered the defendants to ‘vacate the 
Suspension Rule’184 – thus evidencing the 
court’s ability to reinstate values of transparency 
and balanced power in the context of climate 
change litigation. This case demonstrates how 
multiple democratic values can be found playing 
key roles in litigation, and thus shows the signif-
icant connections between the courts and de-
mocracy.  
3.1.5. Clean Air Council v Pruitt 
In the case of Clean Air Council v Pruitt,185 all 
three themes of power, transparency and ac-
countability are touched upon; making this a par-
ticularly strong example of litigation that demon-
strates the courts’ role in upholding democratic 
values. This case was based on the EPA’s re-
consideration of two provisions within the Me-
thane Rule (81 Fed Ref 35,824 – June 3, 2016). 
First, on the 5th of June 2017 – two days after the 
deadline for parties to conduct emissions sur-
veys under the Methane Rule – the EPA pub-
lished ‘a notice of reconsideration and partial 
stay’186 in the Federal Register, which claimed 
that the stay had gone into effect on the 2nd of 
June 2017 – three days before the notice was 
published. Next, on the 16th of June 2017 , the 
EPA published ‘a notice of proposed rulemaking 
announcing its intention to extend the stay “for 
two years” and to “look broadly at the entire 2016 
Rule.”’187 This, the petitioners argued, was a vi-
olation of the Clean Air Act (CAA) section 
307(d)(7)(B)188 for the following reasons: (1) ‘all 
of the issues Administrator Pruitt identified could 
have been, and actually were, raised (and exten-
sively deliberated) during the comment pe-
riod’;189 (2) ‘the stay—which EPA made retroac-
tive to one day before the June 3 compliance 
deadline—eliminates [the threat of increased 
civil penalties for failures to comply]… and thus 
relieves regulated parties of liability they would 
                                                        
183 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 177) 44.  
184 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 177) 44.  
185 Clean Air Council et.al. v Scott Pruitt & Environmen-
tal Protection Agency [2017] 17-1145, D.C Cir. 
186 Ibid. 4. 
187 Clean Air Council (n 185) 5. 
188 See also: 42 U.S.C 7607(d)(7)(B), and 82 Fed Reg, 
25,731 (June 5, 2017). 
189 Clean Air Council (n 185) 6. 
otherwise face’;190 (3) the final rule ‘fails the log-
ical outgrowth test… because the final rule was 
surprisingly distant from the proposed rule’.191 
For these reasons, the court found the EPA’s de-
cision to impose a stay ‘arbitrary, capricious and 
in excess of its statutory authority’192 – siding 
with the petitioners and granting their motion to 
vacate the stay. Although the scope of this case 
appears narrow, it manages to highlight poor 
transparency – in the form of the EPA’s an-
nouncement of the stay, after the fact; account-
ability – by providing opportunity for petitioners 
to challenge EPA’s attempts to remove liabilities 
for oil and gas companies; and, a rebalance of 
power – by holding EPA answerable to their 
claims of ‘inherent power.’193 The combined use 
of these values in the courtroom appears to be 
impactful – demonstrating the scope that litiga-
tion has for defending democratic values. 
Additionally, an interesting feature of this case 
was the dissenting opinion of Judge Brown who 
disagreed entirely with the court’s decision. He 
noted that it was wrong of the court to ‘conclude 
the EPA’s stay falls within [the court’s] jurisdic-
tional reach’194 noting that ‘section 7607(d)(7)(B) 
renders a stay a mere means to facilitate a deci-
sion we lack the authority to review.’195 His re-
sponse thus points to an interesting considera-
tion: that perhaps the courts are becoming more 
willing to decide over political matters – attempt-
ing to achieve democracy even in controversial 
circumstances that ordinarily do not fall under 
their jurisdiction. However, by stepping outside 
their delegated powers – it could also be argued 
that the courts are failing to support democracy 
by abusing their delegated powers. Either way, 
this case presents an interesting insight into the 
role of the courts in safeguarding democracy 
through litigation. 
 
190 Clean Air Council (n 185) 8. 
191 Clean Air Council (n 185) 14. 
192 Clean Air Council (n 185) 23. 
193 Clean Air Council (n 185) 12. 
194 Clean Air Council (n 185) 31.  
195 Clean Air Council (n 185) 31.  
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3.1.6. Natural Resources Defense 
Council v Pruitt 
The case of Natural Resources Defense Council 
v Scott Pruitt196 directly builds on the result of the 
previous case. However here, petitioners ‘seek 
review of the final action of respondents pub-
lished in the Federal Register at 82 Fed. Reg. 
24,878 (May 31, 2017) and titled ‘Stay of Stand-
ards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste 
Landfills and Emission Guidelines and Compli-
ance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Land-
fills.’197 The petitioners asked the court to vacate 
the stay on the basis that the case mirrored the 
arguments of Clean Air Council v Pruitt where 
the defendants had abused the values of power, 
transparency and accountability. Unlike the pre-
vious case, in this example, defendants here 
had manipulated the CAA requirements, fulfilling 
them but failing to offer ‘any explanation [as to] 
why the Administrator concluded that those is-
sues qualified for reconsideration under section 
307(d)(7)(B).’198 In the end, this case was with-
drawn by both parties as the EPA agreed to 
abandon plans to implement the stay, and the 
petitioners accepted that the stay would only 
have affected landfills for 90 days. However, in 
light of the precedent for this case, it could be 
argued that the case would have likely been suc-
cessful – although the opinion of Judge Brown in 
the previous case might have forced the courts 
to act with caution on the basis of avoiding over-
stepping their statutory authority. The presence 
of a near identical case, however, suggests that 
successful litigation patterns are being estab-
lished.  
3.2. Courtroom Limitations: Potential 
Challenges for Protecting Democracy 
3.2.1. City of Oakland v BP plc. 
In the case of the City of Oakland v BP plc.199 
plaintiffs brought a claim against five fossil fuel 
companies, holding them liable for knowingly 
                                                        
196 Natural Resources Defense Council et.al. v Scott 
Pruitt et.al. [2017] 17-1157, D.C Cir. 
197 Ibid. 1.  
198 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 196) 5. 
199 City of Oakland et.al. v BP plc et.al. [2017] 3:17-cv-
06011, N.D Cal. 
200 City of Oakland (n 199) 8. 
contributing to climate change: citing this as a 
public nuisance under federal common law, and 
looking to call on the separation of powers prin-
ciple. The case initially battled with jurisdiction, 
prompting a move from state to federal law 
which was deemed more applicable due to the 
extent of the legal challenges. However, the in-
herently international reach of the case left the 
court debating the appropriate jurisdiction, until 
eventually deciding to leave the question of ju-
risdiction open, noting that ‘there [was] a more 
direct resolution from the Supreme Court and 
[the] court of appeals’200 which would help de-
cide the outcome of the case. The court thus 
turned to the separation of powers principle and, 
unlike other cases considered in this research, 
had to take account of the international dimen-
sion in making the decision. As in the case of Ki-
obel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.201 it was rec-
ognised that ‘where a claim reaches conduct 
within the territory of another sovereign, con-
cerns of unwarranted judicial interference in for-
eign policy are all the more pressing.’202 Thus, 
the separation of powers principle was clearly 
considered more influential in this international 
context than it might have been in a purely na-
tional context. The irony of the case being 
moved to federal level, only to then be dismissed 
under the separation of powers, which would 
also have applied at state level was noted by the 
court, yet they concluded that ‘although the 
scope of plaintiffs’ claims is determined by fed-
eral law, there are sound reasons why regulation 
of the worldwide problem of global warming 
should be determined by our political branches, 
not by our judiciary.’203 Here, the courts utilise 
the separation of powers to justify their refusal to 
decide over this political matter, recognising 
their limitations and acknowledging the distinct 
role of the executive and legislature in address-
ing complex foreign policy issues. This judge-
ment appears straightforward at first glance, 
however in the circumstances of diminishing de-
mocracy, the court’s refusal to decide on the 
matter creates wider problems, particularly for 
climate change. If neither government nor the 
201 Kiobel et.al. v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et.al. 
[2013] 569 US 108. 
202 City of Oakland (n 199) 11.  
203 City of Oakland (n 199) 15.  
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courts are willing to decide on the matter, then 
this becomes a limitation for democracy and civil 
society at large.  
3.2.2. People of the State of California 
v United States 
The case of the People of the State of California 
v United States204 again confronts the separation 
of powers principle, and involves the consolida-
tion of three similar cases which challenged 
Waiver Determinations that had been passed by 
the Secretaries of the Department of Homeland 
Security in August 2017. The Waiver Determina-
tions concerned the construction of border walls, 
and waived the legal requirements of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered 
Species Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act 
and over thirty additional laws that are not rele-
vant to this specific case.205 The plaintiffs argued 
that: ‘(1) the Waivers are ultra vires acts that ex-
ceed the authority delegated by congress; and 
(2) the Waivers are unconstitutional acts under 
a variety of legal doctrines.’206 This case there-
fore looked to utilise the separation of powers 
principle to prove that the Department of Home-
land Security had acted outside of its delegated 
authority. Plaintiffs claimed that by delegating 
power to the Secretary, the defendants were in 
breach of the separation of powers principle: ar-
guing that ‘section 102(c) has granted the Exec-
utive Branch a blanket waiver which is in viola-
tion of the non-delegation doctrine and separa-
tion of powers.’207 The non-delegation doctrine is 
the notion that ‘congress cannot delegate or 
transfer the legislative functions with which it is 
vested.’208 The court disagreed however, and 
while acknowledging the value of these princi-
ples, made a distinction between delegation and 
offering support. The court cited Supreme Court 
advice, which recognised ‘that the separation of 
powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine 
in particular, do not prevent congress from ob-
taining the assistance of its coordinate 
branches.’209 Here, the separation of powers 
principle failed to provide the plaintiffs with a 
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America et.al. [2017] 3:17-cv-01215, S.D Cal. 
205 Ibid.  
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strong enough claim to persuade the courts to 
decide in their favour, instead benefitting the de-
fendants who were able to prove that they had 
not acted outside their authority. In this example, 
invoking the separation of powers argument can 
be seen to have unintended consequences. 
While the court adheres to the separation of 
powers principle – by appropriately applying the 
non-delegation doctrine – it is simultaneously 
limited by the separation of powers, through an 
inability to judge over the matter at the heart of 
this case. The case centres on whether or not 
delegated powers can enforce the waivers ra-
ther than being able to decide on the appropri-
ateness of the waivers in the first place (which 
would be a breach of the court’s jurisdiction, but 
arguably would be a way to hold the executive 
and legislature accountable). This case then, 
demonstrates how the legal consideration of 
these democratic principles can work unhelpfully 
against each other. Difficulties like this could 
limit the ability of the courts to contribute towards 
upholding democracy.  
3.2.3. Lindsay v Republican National 
Committee 
The case of Lindsay v Republican National 
Committee210 demonstrates the barrier that the 
separation of powers and the political question 
doctrine creates for pursuing action on political 
matters in the courtroom. In this case, the plain-
tiff launched a pro se complaint against over 120 
defendants including ‘President Donald Trump 
and most of his cabinet, several state and na-
tional elected officials, and several groups and 
individuals associated with conservative or Re-
publican causes, among others.’211 The plaintiff 
listed a number of grievances, including ‘failing 
to act on global warming.’212 Under the normal 
order of court proceedings, the court has to 
prove that the plaintiff has standing and that the 
claims are justiciable under the jurisdiction of the 
court. In this case, the court found that the plain-
tiff had failed to provide evidence of standing, or 
ripe justiciable disputes – on the basis that most 
210 Lindsay v Republican National Committee et.al. 
[2017] 3:17-cv-00123, W.D. Wis. 
211 Ibid. 1.  
212 Lindsay (n 210) 1.  
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grievances relied on predicted future actions, but 
most significantly the court dismissed the claim 
on the basis of justiciability. The court noted that 
under the political question doctrine, the separa-
tion of powers, and the policy of judicial self-re-
straint, the court ‘does not have the authority to 
resolve the types of broad policy objections 
raised by Lindsay,’213 noting that these claims 
should be reserved for the legislative and exec-
utive branches of government; eventually dis-
missing the case as ‘nonjusticiable.’214 This 
case, like the case above, demonstrates the lim-
its that the separation of powers can place on 
the court’s jurisdiction. Although as before, the 
court appropriately applies the separation of 
powers principle to argue that a decision on this 
issue would be in breach of their delegated pow-
ers, it simultaneously limits the extent to which 
the courts can hold the executive and legislative 
accountable – another important aspect of their 
role as part of democratic checks and balances. 
Although, in this example, the case would likely 
have failed due to a lack of standing, it further 
demonstrates the potential conflict between 
some democratic principles.  
3.2.4. NY State Department of 
Environmental Conservation v FERC 
In the case of NY State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation v FERC,215 the petitioner 
requested the vacation of two orders from FERC 
which authorised Millennium Pipeline Company 
to build a pipeline in New York State – striving to 
hold FERC accountable. The petitioners ques-
tioned FERC’s finding that ‘the petitioners 
waived [their] authority to review [the Water 
Quality Certification]… under Section 401 of the 
Clean Water Act’216 after failing to respond within 
the year’s deadline. Having later denied FERC 
the Water Quality Certification on the basis of 
having ‘failed to evaluate the downstream green-
house gas emissions from the project,’217 the pe-
titioners claimed that FERC was acting unlaw-
fully by having decided to go ahead with the 
                                                        
213 Lindsay (n 210) 3.  
214 Lindsay (n 210) 3.  
215 New York State Department of Environmental Con-
servation v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
[2017] 17-3770-ag, 2nd Cir.  
216 Ibid. 3.  
217 New York State Department of Environmental Con-
servation (n 215) 7. 
building regardless. This case is particularly in-
teresting as the petitioner’s decision to deny the 
application on the basis of incomplete research 
would likely have been supported by the court – 
on the basis that compliance requires full infor-
mation, and that the plaintiffs have a right to hold 
the defendants accountable for a failure to pro-
vide that. However, because of technical details 
laid out in the CAA which seek to achieve timely 
decision making, the court ruled in favour of the 
defendants, supporting the defendants’ view that 
the review process was waived. This case there-
fore identifies an interesting dichotomy – on the 
one hand it can be seen as a win for democracy, 
holding the petitioners accountable for untimely 
decision making, while on the other it can be 
seen as a loss, because it fails to hold the de-
fendants accountable for poor environmental as-
sessment. This case therefore again highlights 
the complicated relationship between the courts 
and democracy, with challenges to tackling ac-
countability, as well as limits to litigation that pre-
vent it from making considered decisions that 
take into account the social and political context.  
3.2.5. Natural Resources Defense 
Council v Perry 
The case of Natural Resources Defence Council 
v Perry218 highlights a tricky legal characteristic, 
outlining a significant barrier to the law’s ability 
to uphold democracy when the government will 
not. The case tackled the Department of En-
ergy’s failure to publish energy standards in the 
Federal Register – therefore preventing them 
from going into effect. Plaintiffs argued that this 
was ‘a violation of the Department’s duties under 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.’219 The 
defendants put forward a range of counter argu-
ments, suggesting first that ‘the citizen-suit pro-
vision of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
does not give citizens a means to sue the De-
partment for failing to comply with a regulation 
adopted under the Act’220 and pointing out that 
citizens could only sue if the Department failed 
218 Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. et.al. v 
Perry et.al. [2017] 17-cv-03404-VC, N.D Cal. 
219 Ibid. 1.  
220 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 218) 3.  
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to comply with the Act itself.221 However, the 
court revealed that the provision actually sup-
ported suing the Department for any ‘failure to 
perform any act or duty under this part which is 
not discretionary... a "duty" can be imposed by a 
regulation as well as a statute.’222 The defend-
ants then attempted to argue that the Error Cor-
rection Rule ‘preserves the Department's "free-
standing authority and discretion to continue to 
assess, modify, or withdraw draft rules that the 
agency has contemplated before those rules are 
published as final rules in the Federal Regis-
ter”’223 – even though no language existed in the 
Rule or the history of its adoption to support this 
claim. Given these circumstances, the court 
sided with the plaintiffs, awarding them summary 
judgement and asking the Department to publish 
the standards within 28 days of the ruling.224 The 
result appears to clearly demonstrate how the 
courts can be used as an avenue for holding 
government accountable – utilising the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act to ensure timely de-
cision making on climate change. Accountability, 
in this way, can be used fruitfully in a litigation 
setting to maintain democratic values throughout 
decision making in government. 
However, this case was re-opened by the de-
fendants who decided to file an emergency mo-
tion to stay pending appeal in March 2018.225 
The motion was granted by the court – effec-
tively over-turning the previous court ruling. In 
this example, the Court of Appeals found a dif-
ferent interpretation of the Department’s duty 
and agreed with the defendant’s argument which 
met the conditions necessary for a stay. This re-
versal is noteworthy as it undermines the previ-
ous court decision and undoes the court’s ruling 
which promoted accountability, and furthered 
democracy. It is a fundamental feature of the ju-
diciary that most decisions can be challenged – 
leaving outcomes vulnerable to appeals and fur-
ther debate. This clearly limits the ability of litiga-
tion to enforce democratic values in a concrete 
manner that ensures sustainable and durable 
application over time. 
                                                        
221 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 218) 3.  
222 Natural Resources Defense Council. (n 218) 3.  
223 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 218) 5. 
4. Conclusion  
This investigation sought to explore the role of 
the courts in maintaining democracy during a pe-
riod of crisis; focusing specifically on the ways 
the courts have dealt with the separation of pow-
ers, transparency, and accountability in the con-
text of climate change litigation. While the find-
ings of this research can only begin to point at 
certain connections, opportunities, and limita-
tions – they will hopefully shed new light on the 
complex role of the courts in sustaining democ-
racy.  
My analysis of recent climate change cases re-
vealed three recurring themes which directly re-
flected legal issues as well as being key demo-
cratic values. These three democratic values: 
the separation of powers, transparency, and ac-
countability each create unique opportunities 
and challenges for litigation. Studying the cases 
helped to show how these values manifested 
themselves in the courtroom and revealed how 
they could be approached in ways that support 
democracy. Significantly, analysis of these 
cases helped to demonstrate the strength of 
these values when addressed together. Democ-
racy, as already mentioned, is built on a variety 
of values which shift over time or according to 
circumstance – therefore, evidence of multiple 
values in litigation contributes to the courts’ 
heightened ability to protect democracy. In gen-
eral, this research has revealed that important 
democratic principles are being actively ad-
dressed in the courts, showing how democracy 
reaches beyond the executive and legislature. 
Many argue that there is an urgent need to coun-
teract Donald Trump’s move away from democ-
racy – the findings here point to the valuable role 
of litigation for maintaining democracy.  
Nonetheless, the courts unsurprisingly ad-
dressed each of these democratic values differ-
ently. As was indicated in chapter two, each 
value had a different relationship to democracy 
and litigation – explaining their varied application 
across climate change litigation. These findings 
224 Natural Resources Defense Council (n 218) 9.  
225 Natural Resources Defense Council et.al. v Perry 
et.al. [2018] 18-15380, N.D Cal. 
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are significant as they contribute towards under-
standings of democracy as a whole, and the 
complex connection it has with litigation.  
Analysis of the cases highlighted how the sepa-
ration of powers could be seen as both an op-
portunity and a limitation for democracy. For ex-
ample, if the separation of powers is considered 
an important feature of democracy, then the lim-
its on the court (which stop it being able to rule 
over political matters, and in particular climate 
change) can be seen as furthering democracy. 
However, if holding the branches of government 
to account is viewed as an important feature of 
democracy, then the courts’ inability to act out-
side their delegated powers is a limitation of their 
ability to uphold democracy. This dilemma pre-
sents a challenge for those trying to explore the 
role that the courts play in protecting democracy 
– but recognises an important aspect of the sep-
aration of powers principle, that might benefit 
from further research. 
Transparency on the other hand, appeared to 
have a less complicated relationship with litiga-
tion, and presented less of a challenge in the 
context of the courts. The majority of cases 
which featured the value of transparency were 
successful, arguably due to the straightforward 
way that transparency is dealt with in litigation; 
the agent either acted according to certain 
guidelines related to transparency, or they did 
not. This points to the idea that transparency can 
be addressed more easily in the courtroom than 
other elements of democracy, making it a valua-
ble example of the ability of the courts to protect 
democracy. 
My investigations have revealed that accounta-
bility is heavily connected to the other demo-
cratic values of the separation of powers and 
transparency, and this makes it difficult to ad-
dress. As shown in the analysis of the cases, ac-
countability issues are often in conflict with other 
democratic values which present more accessi-
ble legal arguments in the context of litigation. 
My examination of accountability issues in the 
courtroom demonstrated how these three dem-
ocratic values can work against one another, 
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sometimes acting as a limitation for the courts, 
in their ability to maintain democracy.  
Clearly, these three values operate differently 
within both a legal and democratic context and 
suggest a very complex relationship between 
the courts and democracy – one that requires 
careful legal strategy to achieve favourable out-
comes. In climate change litigation in particular, 
it is clear that whilst the courts are challenged by 
the political context of the subject matter, there 
have been successes from narrow legal ap-
proaches that address themes of power, trans-
parency, and accountability. This is an important 
finding for trying to better understand the ability 
of the courts to protect democracy.  
This research has also opened up avenues for 
further study. While this study reflects findings 
from climate change litigation: there is scope to 
establish whether these democratic values apply 
across all areas of law. Further research might 
endeavour to investigate the potential breadth of 
their application, and whether other democratic 
values emerge as significant contributors to de-
mocracy through the courts. Similarly, further re-
search might look at the ways in which courts’ 
opinions are shifting – marking their digression 
from the separation of powers and their perhaps 
increasing willingness to address politics in the 
courtroom, albeit that this is controversial. 
Though this research points to areas where de-
mocracy can be protected by the courts, the lon-
gevity of this impact is as yet unknown. As men-
tioned previously, the courts provide numerous 
opportunities for appeal. Positions may therefore 
be reversed, and this feature of the law could 
limit the long-term “stickiness”226 of litigation’s 
contribution to democracy – the result of which 
can only be revealed over time. 
In conclusion then, litigation clearly has a com-
plicated relationship with democracy, and in the 
context of climate change this research reveals 
important and interesting findings that help gain 
a better understanding of an important source of 
resistance to Trump. What this research can 
conclude however, is that litigation can drive, 
and is driving, decision making, even when the 
executive and legislature are paying scant atten-
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tion to upholding democratic principles. Ulti-
mately this research offers hope that democracy 
is not doomed to depart under Trump. It also of-
fers an increased understanding of the important 
role of the courts as a much-needed stronghold 
for maintaining democracy in the US. Litigation 
may not be the most direct or effective way of 
sustaining democracy, but it can contribute sig-
nificantly when the executive and legislature are 
neglecting to do so.  
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